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ABSTRACT 
Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) are designed and built to have minimum crew sizes 
thus, while the ship is in port, there are fewer crewmembers to facilitate pier monitoring, 
security, and conducting mustering of personnel.  The crew of LCS ships presently have 
too many responsibilities to ensure 100% coverage of the Pier area 100% of the time, and 
cannot manually maintain a real time muster of all ships personnel.  This lack of coverage 
and situational awareness could make LCS ships vulnerable to terrorist attacks or terrorist 
monitoring. 
This thesis addresses the capability gap for complete and automated personnel 
mustering and situational awareness in the pier area for LCS class ships.  Through 
applying the Systems Engineering process, the concept, external systems diagram, 
requirements, and functional architectures for a generic solution are proposed.  The 
proposed solution is an autonomous system utilizing facial recognition software to 
maintain a muster of the ship’s crew, while in parallel monitoring the pier area, looking 
for any known person of interest (e.g., terrorists) and providing appropriate alerts. 
Additionally, this thesis provides a demonstrable proof-of-concept prototype 
system solution, named Pier Watchman.  Its instantiated physical architecture of a 
specific autonomous solution to pier monitoring and personnel mustering is provided. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The USS Freedom class of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) are designed and built to 
have minimum crew sizes.  LCS was designed with maximum automation to facilitate 
this minimum manning concept. The core crew is a compliment of 40 sailors with an 
additional 35 personnel for the mission package crew (Globalsecurity, 2009).  This 
minimum crew concept means that, while the ship is in port, there are fewer 
crewmembers to facilitate pier monitoring and maintaining pier security.  Additionally, 
there are fewer sailors to conduct basic duties such as the mustering of personnel.  
However, the watch standers and personnel for LCS presently have too many 
responsibilities to ensure 100% coverage of the pier area, 100% of the time, and, thus, 
they cannot manually maintain a 100% muster of all ship’s personnel 100% of the time.  
This lack of coverage and situational awareness could make LCS ships vulnerable to 
terrorist attacks or terrorist monitoring. 
Using a Systems Engineering approach, this thesis designs and recommends a 
generalized solution for the problems associated with having a reduced crew size on LCS 
ships.  Initially, this thesis provides a concept, external systems diagram (ESD), 
requirements, and functional architecture of a generic solution, and then instantiating a 
real-world physical architecture of an autonomous system that provides real-time, 
automatic mustering and pier monitoring capability for enhanced situational awareness.  
The viability of the generic solution is then verified through construction and testing of a 
proof-of-concept system. 
The generic functional architecture designates that the mustering of personnel 
must be performed while in parallel monitoring the pier area.  Additionally, this generic 
functional architecture requires that the solution maintain a database local to the LCS 
ship that stores the identity of all personnel in the pier area and onboard the ship.  The 
database will have three sets: known friendly persons (e.g., crewmembers), persons of 




representation of the way in which this database will function.  The database will be 
utilized to maintain the mustering status of the LCS’s crew, any detected persons of 
interest, and all unknown persons.   
  
Figure 1.   Generic Database Diagram 
In order to meet the requirements provided in the generic functional architecture 
and conform to the present LCS crew size an automated solution was chosen.  
Additionally, the automated option would leverage existing LCS capabilities (e.g., 
external cameras), be cost effective, feasible, economical, and reduce the workload on the 
present crew.  One such enabling technology is automatic facial recognition, where a 
computer is “trained” to detect faces from video data and then correlate detected faces 
with stored faces in a database to automatically “recognize” a face.  In Figure 1, all of the 
functions to do with facial recognition and facial detection, and updating the respective 
databases would be done automatically.  
First, the proposed automated system will utilize LCS’s existing external cameras 
to provide automated situational awareness of the pier area.  These cameras will 
constantly monitor the pier area around the ship.  As an LCS ship is already designed 
with six external cameras that provide 360 degrees of video coverage around the ship 
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(Hurley, 2010), facial recognition technology applied to video data from these cameras 
will attempt to automate 100% surveillance awareness. The proposed system will process 
the live video feeds identifying persons by attempting facial recognition on any 
individuals within the system’s line of sight. Upon detection of a face in the pier area, all 
facial images will be matched against the known database, which will be updated based 
on a positive or undefined match.  Figure 1 displays the interaction of the LCS local 
database to the rest of the automated system.  This figure also designates the three 
categories for facial images: Known Friendly Person (KFP), Unknown Person (UKP), 
and Person of Interest (POI).  Updates to the stored facial images database for the POIs 
and KFPs will be performed as needed to facilitate both an accurate muster and POI 
status.  Upon significant positive correlation between a detected face and a face of a POI 
(e.g., terrorist) that was stored in the database, the system will automatically provide an 
alert to the watch standers for determination of any need for further action.  Additionally, 
all facial images that do not match a previously obtained image will be categorized as 
UKP and given a unique identifier.  The system will then autonomously monitor the 
unknown person’s movements for behavior that matches a predetermined set of 
suspicious activities.  If the unknown person’s activities are considered suspicious, an 
alert will be provided to the watch standers to determine whether further action is 
necessary.   
Second, the proposed system will perform mustering of all ship’s personnel as 
they board and exit the ship.  In addition to the existing external cameras on the LCS 
platform, the proposed autonomous system for mustering includes the addition of one 
camera located at the entrance and exit location from the ship (normally termed 
“quarterdeck”), which is moveable depending upon where the brow of the ship is located.  
The field of view of the camera will capture the face of all persons that enter/exit the 
ship.  The system will capture the face of all personnel as the ship’s personnel follow the 
standard procedure of facing the Officer of the Deck (OOD) and requesting permission to 
come aboard/go ashore.  The additional camera will be incorporated into the OOD’s 
podium so that the ships personnel will face both the OOD and the mustering camera at 
the same time as they come and go from the ship.  Upon significant positive correlation 
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between a detected face of a crewmember crossing the ship’s prow and a stored face of 
an LCS crewmember, that person’s mustering status is properly updated via a data entry 
into the Pier Watchman mustering database.  Thus, using video data from the camera at 
the brow, the proposed solution will automatically detect faces and query the mustering 
section of the database for constant real-time mustering capability of ship personnel.  
A portion of the proposed solution was then prototyped in order to confirm its 
viability through creation of a proof-of-concept system called “Pier Watchman.”  The 
Pier Watchman automated physical system consists of a camera that records real-time 
video data, face detection software that executes on the camera’s video image, face 
recognition software that executes on the camera’s video image correlating detected faces 
with faces stored in a database, and finally, the database of stored facial images.  The 
results from testing performed on the Pier Watchman Proof of Concept System, provided 
in Chapter V, show that the proposed system solution is viable and that further research 
and development on a full-scale system is warranted.   
To conclude, this thesis provides a concept, ESD, requirements and a functional 
architecture to a generalized solution for mustering and pier monitoring on LCS ships.  
This thesis not only addresses the need for an autonomous system, but also uses a 
Systems Engineering approach to define requirements for the autonomous system.  
Additionally, a proof-of-concept system was designed and implemented, providing a 
specific autonomous solution’s instantiated physical architecture prototype solution of 
one specific approach to autonomous mustering and pier monitoring.   
 xix
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This initial chapter is an introduction that provides a short synopsis of the subjects 
presented in this thesis.  It first explains the problem that exists, then proposes a system 
solution, introduces the instantiated proof-of-concept system to a specific solution, and 
concludes with a thesis outline. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
One may stipulate that the U.S. Military does not provide adequate Force 
Protection for its ships, as one recalls the attack on the USS Cole in 2000.  One solution 
to further enhance Force Protection on Navy ships is to increase the personnel dedicated 
to Force Protection.  The USS Freedom class of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) are 
designed and built, to have minimum crew sizes.  LCS was designed with maximum 
automation to facilitate this minimum manning concept. The core crew is a compliment 
of 40 sailors with an additional 35 personnel for the mission package crew 
(Globalsecurity, 2009).  This minimum crew concept means that while the ship is in port, 
there are fewer crewmembers to facilitate pier monitoring and maintain pier security.  
Understandably, there are also fewer sailors to conduct basic duties, such as the 
mustering of personnel.  The watch standers and personnel for LCS presently have too 
many responsibilities to ensure 100% coverage of the Pier area 100% of the time, and 
they cannot manually maintain a 100% muster of all ship’s personnel 100% of the time.  
This lack of coverage and situational awareness could make LCS ships vulnerable to 
terrorist attacks or terrorist monitoring.  Thus, the crews of LCS ships can benefit from 
the implementation of any technology that relieves the administrative burden on them.  
Such a solution is needed in order to enhance the Force Protection capability and reduce 
administrative burdens.  In order to meet the minimum manning concept that is employed 
on LCS, the optimal solution would most likely be an automated system that would not 
require additional personnel to operate.   
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1. Personal Motivation/Experience 
I have experienced the difficulty in maintaining both a vigilant watch of the pier 
area and an accurate muster of ships personnel first hand while serving on multiple 
different ships during my nearly 17 years in the United States Navy as both an enlisted 
sailor and officer. Additionally, from January of 2006 until December of 2007, I served 
as the Production, Test, and Launch Officer for the USS Freedom, (LCS-1), while 
stationed in Marinette Wisconsin, with Supervisor of Shipbuilding Gulf Coast.  My job 
entailed all aspects of ship construction, test, and working with members of the ships’ 
crew, ensuring that their needs were adequately addressed.  At this point in my career, I 
had been stationed on United States Navy ships for more than seven years.  From this 
experience, I was intimately aware of the duties that ships crew are required to perform.  
The major difference with LCS-1 in regards to other ships, was that the size of the crew 
was much smaller than any I had served on; at the same time the ship itself was more 
complex than the others.  This resulted in a ship design that required maximum 
automation.   
The level of engineering that went into all aspects of the ship was very 
impressive, right down to the external cameras that were utilized to provide 360 degrees 
of video coverage around the ship.  The original purpose of the external cameras was to 
reduce crew size and watch requirements.  All ships are required to maintain a visual 
watch around the ship (USCG, 2009, 12).  Most ships accomplish this by stationing 
multiple personnel to visually monitor 360 degrees around the ship.  My previous ship 
had three extra people performing this duty: a port, starboard, and aft lookout.  However, 
LCS-1 was able to meet this requirement through utilization of the aforementioned 
external cameras, thus removing the need for three personnel to stand the lookout 
watches.  The video feeds were displayed on a console so that the personnel on watch on 
the bridge could easily monitor the images.  
While addressing LCS-1 crew concerns, I became aware of the need to simplify 
all duties that the crew performs in order to make their jobs manageable, while still 
maintaining the same level of situational awareness and security as any other Navy ship. 
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B. SHIP CLASS GENERAL INFORMATION 
The USS Freedom (LCS-1) is the lead ship of the Freedom class of Littoral 
Combat Ships.  An image of the LCS-1, Figure 2, shows the ship underway in August 
2008 from Marinette, Wisconsin.  As mentioned earlier, LCS-1 was designed with 
maximum automation to facilitate a minimum manning concept.  The automation on LCS 
encompasses systems such as the engineering plant to include automated starting of all 
main propulsion engines and generators through touch screen interfaces located (Hurley, 
2010).  Additionally, the Common Radio Room (CRR) has an integrated and automated 
external communications system controlled by a single operator that can interface the 
entire system.  The CRR provides the ability to activate circuits with a single mouse click 
or schedule circuit activation by time or event, increasing operator efficiency and 
accuracy while reducing communications watch stander requirements (Lockheed Martin, 
2010).  The aforementioned areas of automation are only a few of the automated systems 
integrated into the LCS platform and are provided as examples of the importance of 
automation for LCS operability due to the limited crew of seventy-five sailors, forty core 
crew members and an additional thirty-five personnel for the mission package crew 
(Global Security, 2009).  To better understand the minimum manning concept, a 
comparable ship in size would be the Oliver Hazard Perry Class of Frigates (FFG).  FFGs 




Figure 2.   Picture of USS Freedom, LCS-1, Underway from Marinette Wisconsin 
(From Scott, 2008) 
C. THE CURRENT MUSTERING PROCESS 
The mustering of personnel on United States Navy ships while in port is a vital 
daily duty that accounts for each member of the crew.  This process is generally 
conducted in the morning by each division on a ship and requires some form of written 
paperwork to be generated.  All mustering paperwork is delivered to a central location 
where an accurate accounting of all personnel is verified and finally reported to the ship’s 
commanding officer.  The mustering process generally provides an accurate muster at the 
time it is conducted, but this muster is not maintained throughout the workday and is not 
updated as crewmembers leave and return to the ship.  This means that the immediate 
status of whether a sailor is onboard or not, is not accurately known. Thus, there is an 
unmet need for constant mustering status of ship personnel. 
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D. THE CURRENT FORCE PROTECTION PROCESS 
The Department of Defense defines Force Protection as preventive measures 
taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include 
family members), resources, facilities, and critical information (Department of Defense, 
2002, 172).  Force Protection is a vital duty performed by Navy personnel both while the 
ship is in port, and underway.  The force protection process discussed here is a general 
procedure, and does not constitute the exact procedure utilized.  By describing only a 
general explanation of the current procedure for force protection, the advantage of the 
new system will be adequately made known, without providing classified information or 
compromising the safety of naval vessels. 
Ship personnel armed with various weapons perform force protection for LCS 
class ships while in port.  These personnel are responsible for visually monitoring the 
surrounding pier area.  Force protection watches rotate periodically with the average 
person performing pier monitoring duties between four to six hours at a time.  The 
number of personnel on watch can vary but is generally about six people.  The Force 
Protection Officer (FPO) controls the daily inport force protection of the ship.  One 
person assumes this position for 24 hours and any force protection issues are referred to 
this person for resolution.  However, these people will not be able to observe 100% of the 
pier area 100% of the time.  
E. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING OVERVIEW 
Using a Systems Engineering approach, this thesis proposes a generic solution for 
one of the problems associated with having a reduced crew size on LCS ships by first 
introducing a concept, external systems diagram, requirements, and generic functional 
architecture.  Then, an autonomous system that provides real time automatic mustering 
and pier monitoring capability for enhanced situational awareness that satisfies the 
requirements from the generic functional architecture is proposed.  Finally, a proof-of-
concept system to demonstrate the viability of the proposed systems design is designed 
and built.   
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This thesis applies the Systems Engineering process to address the capability gap 
of mustering personnel and situational awareness on LCS and the pier area.  Initially, the 
need for the proposed system is discussed.  This is followed by a discussion of the 
Systems Engineering process applied to the system design of a proposed solution.  
Through applying the Systems Engineering concepts, conducting a careful review of the 
system solution concept, and recommendation of the instantiated physical architecture, an 
apparent technology gap was discovered on LCS ships that could be filled through the 
utilization of an automated system that performed facial detection, facial recognition, 
mustering, and area monitoring autonomously.  This includes providing the External 
Systems Diagram (bound system design), and defining system interface requirements.  
The system architecture for the proposed solution is created and presented following the 
Systems Engineering “V” approach (as defined in Chapter II).  The architectures created 
and presented for proposed system are as follows: functional architecture hierarchy, 
functional architecture decomposition, using IDEF0 modeling, and finally, instantiated 
physical architecture of a specific proposed solution.   
To show that a full-scale system is a viable solution to enhancing situational 
awareness and force protection, a small-scale example, a proof-of-concept system, was 
designed, implemented, and tested. This thesis presents this implemented proof-of-
concept system to demonstrate the functionality of the proposed system solution.  This 
proof-of-concept system, called “Pier Watchman,” emulates the existing camera 
functionality on LCS, without the need to use the exact hardware found on board ship.  
This is because the software being demonstrated is the software that would be used on 
any camera on LCS (including for both pier monitoring and automated personnel 
mustering).  Chapter V shows the initial instantiated physical architecture plan for the 
proposed autonomous approach to the proposed solution proof-of-concept system, which 
is further described in Chapter VI.  Designing, implementing, and testing the proof-of-
concept system demonstrates the viability of the larger proposed system solution for 
LCS.  
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F. THESIS OUTLINE 
This section presents succinct overviews of each chapter in this thesis. Each 
chapter in this thesis builds upon the previous chapter through applying the Systems 
Engineering process. 
1. Chapter II:  Application of Systems Engineering Process  
This chapter explains the systems engineering approach that was utilized to 
design and develop the proposed generalized system architecture and also to design and 
implement the proposed system Pier Watchman Proof-of-Concept specific solution 
system.  The process of developing this system required a necessary roadmap for 
architecture design of a proposed system, and design, implementation, and testing of the 
Pier Watchman Proof-of-Concept System for successful completion.  This chapter 
describes how the Systems Engineering “V” provided the roadmap that allowed for the 
successful design of the generic architecture and the functional and construction of the 
Pier Watchman Proof-of-Concept System.   
2. Chapter III: Design Reference Mission  
This chapter discusses the Design Reference Mission (DRM), which provides the 
operational scenario and the mission that the end system must accomplish.  This 
document is linked back to established Navy requirements and is the basis for 
development of the system architecture.  Overall, this chapter provides the necessary 
scope to determine how the finished system must work in order to be successful. 
3. Chapter IV: Generic System Architecture  
This chapter provides the generic system External Systems Diagram and 
Functional Architecture created from the DRM.  The generic functional architecture 
hierarchy and decomposition are provided.  Chapter IV then decomposes each level of 
the Functional Architecture for the proposed solution.  The generic architecture provided 
in this chapter provides the basis for the solution to the identified capability gap. 
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4. Chapter V: Proposed System Solution 
This chapter provides a brief analysis of alternatives for potential approaches to 
fill the need described in the generic architecture.  This chapter then expounds upon one 
proposed solution and provides procedures that it would utilize.  The chapter then 
discusses how the proposed autonomous approach to the system solution will both 
enhance pier security and modify the way in which mustering of ship’s personnel occurs.  
Chapter V then discusses a vital portion of this solution, automatic facial recognition, 
including a description of how a particular algorithm used for facial recognition works, 
including its benefits and limitations.  Additionally, the Pier Watchman Proof-of-Concept 
System is explained.  The need for creating an instantiated physical architecture of a 
proposed autonomous solution, an actual implementation and demonstration of a proof-
of-concept system, how it was created, the components it was assembled from, the issues 
with its creation, its performance and limitations, and the benefits gained from its 
creation are all discussed. 
5. Chapter VI: Summary and Conclusions 
This final chapter provides a summary and conclusion to the thesis.  It 
summarizes the need for the proposed system, the concept of the proposed system, and 
the benefits of creating this system.  Furthermore, it identifies benefits and lessons 
learned from designing and building a prototype for the proposed autonomous solution, 
known as, the Pier Watchman Proof-of-Concept System.  This chapter concludes with 
identifying areas for future research. 
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II. APPLICATION OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
This chapter describes the systems engineering approach that was utilized to 
design and develop a generic system architecture, a proposed system solution, and to both 
design and implement the instantiated physical architecture of the proposed Pier 
Watchman Proof-of-Concept System.  Additionally, this chapter describes how the 
Systems Engineering “V” provided the roadmap that allowed for the successful design of 
a generic system architecture, a proposed solution design, and construction of the Pier 
Watchman Proof-of-Concept System that met the generic solution design.   
A. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
Systems Engineering can be defined as a multidisciplinary engineering discipline 
in which decisions and designs are based on their effect on the system as a whole (Maier 
and Rechtin, 2000).  In order to maintain the required engineering discipline, a process 
must be utilized that details system requirements so that the system that is designed and 
built meets these requirements.  The eventual goal is to produce an actual system that 
fulfills the requirements of enhancing pier security and real time mustering while not 
increasing the LCS crew size.  The concept, external systems diagram, requirements, and 
functional architecture for such a system is provided.  After a brief analysis of 
alternatives, a specific solution is proposed and a proof-of-concept system, termed Pier 
Watchman, is created.  The name Pier Watchman is based on its purpose of monitoring 
the pier area and the fact that it is the application of the graduate system developed by the 
Naval Postgraduate Systems Engineering Department, Network-Centric Systems 
Engineering Track and corresponding lab, called “Watchman.” 
B. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING V-MODEL 
A Systems Engineering Process is a comprehensive, iterative, and recursive 
problem solving process (Department of Defense, 2001, 31).  In the development of the 
generic architecture, proposed system solution, and implementation of an instantiated 
physical architecture, the systems engineering V-model was utilized (Department of 
Defense, 2001, 65).  This model can be broken down into distinct phases as displayed in 
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Figure 3.  A new system design should start on the left side of the “V” with the project 
definition and system concept to establish the system level design requirements.  Then 
continuing down the left side of the “V,” item level design requirements are established.  
This Systems Engineering V-model has predetermined review points along the way, 
where a detailed review is conducted to ensure the system is ready to move into the next 
phase.  Once the design is completed at the bottom of the “V,” then the fabrication, 
integration, and testing phases can begin, which is shown as moving up the right side of 
the “V.”  
 
Figure 3.   Systems Engineering V-Model (From Department of Defense, 2001, 65) 
C. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND SYSTEM CONCEPT 
The initial phase of a project starts with defining a problem or identifying a 
capability gap that needs to be filled.  This phase describes what could be built or 
procured in order to fill the need and can result in the formulation of the idea for a 
system. This initial phase does not establish that a system will be built; it only states that 
a system could fill a need and that further evaluation should be conducted.  
A need was identified for the USS Freedom class of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) 
that the watch standers and personnel for LCS presently have too many responsibilities to 
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ensure 100% coverage of the Pier area 100% of the time and they cannot manually 
maintain a 100% muster of all ship’s personnel 100% of the time.  This lack of coverage 
and situational awareness could make LCS ships vulnerable to terrorist attacks and 
terrorist monitoring.  A system concept was developed and is provided in Chapter IV. 
D. SYSTEM LEVEL DESIGN REQUIREMENTS AND ARCHITECTURE 
The requirements and architecture phase is where the generic architecture for 
system development is created and the system requirements are defined.  The architecture 
provides a top-down view of the system.  This phase results in a well-defined system 
architecture that has clear linkages to requirements.  The architecture properly links to the 
previous phase, so that the system to be built meets the original needs.   
In the case of the system solution, a Design Reference Mission (DRM) was 
developed, which provides all of the necessary information in order to create a scenario 
in order to perform simulations.  The simulations can then be run utilizing different 
solutions to address the problem defined at the beginning of the DRM.  The DRM will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter III.  From the DRM a generic system architecture was 
created.  The generic system architecture consists of the external system diagram, 
requirements, and functional architecture for the generic system.      
1. Analysis of Alternatives 
The analysis of alternatives (AOA) is a process that looks at the required need, the 
generic architecture, and identifies potentially viable solutions.  Assessments are 
performed on each possible solution evaluating for effectiveness, achievability, cost, and 
viability (United States Air Force, 2008).  Once an AOA is complete and a solution has 
been chosen for further development then the item level design can begin. 
E. ITEM LEVEL DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 
After one executes an AOA, the next step is to define the proposed alternative’s 
physical architecture through the item level design requirements phase.  These detailed 
specifications provide the bottom-up system design by breaking up the larger system into 
individual sub-systems and then breaking up the subsystems into components.  This 
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thesis selects a particular alternative and provides its instantiated physical architecture.   
Additionally in this phase, the test and evaluation plans, to include acceptance tests, are 
developed.  The acceptance must ensure that the needs described in the initial phase are 
satisfied.  At the conclusion of this part of the process, all design requirements are 
complete, the left side of the Systems Engineering “V,” and the system is ready to begin 
fabrication, integration and test phases.   
F. FABRICATE, INTEGRATE, AND TEST 
As one moves from the bottom of the “V” and up the right side of the “V,” the 
design that was formulated in the previous sections is turned into a real system.  First, 
individual components are acquired or built and assembled into sub-systems. (Buede, 
2000).  Then, unit tests are performed on these sub-systems.  After the sub-systems have 
been created and their unit tests have been satisfactorily performed, these sub-systems are 
ready for integration into the larger system (Buede, 2000). 
The systems integration step is where all of the components and sub-systems are 
assembled and integrated into a complete working system (Blanchard and Fabrycky, 
2006).  The integration includes debugging of all software and testing of the complete 
integrated system.  The complete system operation is verified when an acceptance test is 
demonstrated to and approved by the stakeholders.  The acceptance test is the same test 
that was agreed upon earlier with the system’s stakeholders, but due to any engineering 
change orders, the acceptance test may have incurred minor changes during the build 
cycle.  All parties involved must agree upon any changes that have occurred.  Upon 
successful completion of the acceptance test, the system is delivered to the entity that 
paid for its construction, and a determination for further orders is made.  Fabrication and 
integration is where the majority of the time and work on the system occurs.  However, it 
will only be successful if the earlier design was performed correctly.  
For the proposed solution, the actual fabrication, integration, and testing that will 
be discussed is for a proposed, specific instance of the proposed system’s functional 
architecture.  The implemented proof-of-concept system that was designed and 
assembled in the Network-Centric Systems Engineering (NCSE) lab at NPS was created 
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to provide an instance of the proposed system.  The proof-of-concept would accomplish 
and demonstrate in part the overarching goals that the full proposed system must 
accomplish as specified in the generic architecture.  A detailed description of how the 
proof-of-concept system was built, is provided in Chapter VI. 
To conclude, a Systems Engineering V-model yields an achievable roadmap for 
system creation.  Additionally, the Systems Engineering V-model was utilized for the 
design of a generic architecture, proposed solution, AOA, and the design and 
implementation of the Pier Watchman Proof-of-Concept System.  The next chapter 
provides the Design Reference Mission utilized for scenario creation that enables the 
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III. DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION (DRM)   
This chapter discusses the first part of the left side of the Systems Engineering 
“V” by presenting the Design Reference Mission (DRM) that provides the proposed 
mission the end system must accomplish.  This DRM document links back to established 
Navy requirements and is the basis for development of the system architecture.  This 
chapter provides the necessary scope to determine how the finished proposed system 
must work in order to be successful.  The DRM provides the basis for the creation of a 
scenario.  The scenario can then be utilized to simulate how a particular solution would 
perform in context to the expected environment, while attempting to fill the capability 
gap or need.   
A. DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION 
The system architecture for the proposed system was based on a Design 
Reference Mission (DRM) that explains the expectations and requirements the actual 
system must fulfill.  These expectations and requirements are explained by defining the 
threat and operational environment.  The DRM seeks to provide a common framework to 
link systems engineering efforts and help ensure an “apples-to-apples” comparison of 
analytical results (Skolnick and Wilkins 2000, 209).  The DRM presented here defines 
the problem in a context that allows for the modeling of a solution.  The object of the 
DRM is not to provide a solution, but rather allow multiple solutions to be envisioned, as 
long as they succeed in completing the requirements of the DRM.  The DRM starts with 
the problem definition and operational need.   
1. Problem Definition 
As discussed in Chapter I, the watch standers and personnel for LCS presently 
have too many responsibilities to ensure 100% coverage of the Pier area 100% of the 
time.  Additionally, the LCS crew cannot maintain a real-time muster status of all ships 
personnel.  This lack of coverage and situational awareness could make LCS ships 
vulnerable to terrorist attacks or terrorist monitoring. 
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2. Operational Need 
A system to enhance Situational Awareness and Pier Security for LCS-1 class 
ships will need the operational capabilities listed below: 
• Provide situational awareness around pier-tied ship at a minimum distance 
of 200 yards from the ship.  
• Provide ability to monitor pier area and alert watch standers of possible 
threats. 
• Provide interface with existing LCS infrastructure (e.g., cameras, power, 
FPO). 
• Provide a real time crew mustering capability. 
3. Operational Situation (OPSIT) Generation  
Operational Situations (OPSITs) are discrete multi-engagement events with 
specified operational characteristics (Skolnick and Wilkins, 2000, 213).  By defining the 
operating conditions and presenting defined assumptions, a set of operational scenarios 
can be created.  The operational scenarios are described in the next sections starting with 
the Projected Operating Environment. 
4. Projected Operating Environment  
The Projected Operating Environment (POE) described in this DRM can be 
utilized in the creation of a scenario.  The establishment of scenario criteria allows for the 
utilization of simulation so that the viability of different system designs can be verified to 
solve the problem defined earlier.  A true representation of system performance can be 
obtained through simulation by providing a set of environmental conditions that represent 
a typical operating environment.  The next sections of the DRM provide a context from 
which one can design a system by specifically providing the geography and weather 
conditions in which the system will be required to operate. 
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a.  Geography 
The location selected for this DRM is the Marinette Marine port in 
Marinette, Wisconsin, as pictured in Figure 4.  Marinette was chosen because the weather 
conditions for this location encompass most of the weather variations in which the LCS 
will be expected to operate.  Figure 4 shows the LCS located pier side and identified with 
the arrow.  This layout of this port represents the average layout of ports in both the 
United States and foreign countries.   
 
Figure 4.   Map of Operating Area (From Google Maps, 2009) 
b.  Weather 
In order to meet the projected operating environment, the solution is 
expected to operate outdoors in all weather environments.  Weather information for the 




Figure 5.   Average Temperatures (From city–data.com for Marinette, WI) 
 
 
Figure 6.   Precipitation (From city–data.com for Marinette, WI) 
 
 




Figure 8.   Wind Speed (From city–data.com for Marinette, WI) 
 
 
Figure 9.   Snowfall (From city–data.com for Marinette, WI) 
 
Figure 10.   Sunshine (From city–data.com for Marinette, WI) 
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Figure 11.   Cloudy Days (From city–data.com for Marinette, WI) 
5. Threat 
The threats are an enemy force (e.g., terrorist) that is actively gathering 
intelligence on the LCS ship in preparation for an asymmetric attack from the pier area in 
order to damage or destroy the ship and the lack of situational awareness due to unknown 
crew muster status.   
6. Assumed Threat General Conditions 
The following information on the general threat conditions provides the basis for 
creation of the capabilities that the system must have in order to overcome the assumed 
threats.  The scenario utilized in the development of the system assumes the enemy 
conducts surveillance on an LCS class ship by personnel that are from a reasonably 
sophisticated terrorist organization that is non-state sponsored or a suicide bomber 
capable of a covert land attack.  Such a threat would be recognized when the POIs 
approach the pier area within the monitoring zone. 
The expected threat characterizations can be broken down into a person running, 
jogging, walking, and standing in the pier area with the probabilities of each as shown in 
Table 1.  The items in this table assume that all persons are initially outside of 200 yards 




Threat Speed Probability Distance From Ship 
Running (15 feet per second) Low 200 Yards 
Jogging (7 feet per second) Medium 200 Yards 
Walking (3 feet per second) High 200 Yards 
Person 
Standing (0 feet per second) High 200 Yards 
Table 1.   Threat Characterization Table 
The next item that is important for system design is the expected number of 
personnel that need to be identified simultaneously.  In order to provide a valid system 
the determination was made that system must be able to successfully perform personnel 
identification under the following threat size, attack timing, and coordination: 
Threat size (personnel): 
• 1 
• 3 
Attack Timing and Coordination: 
• One POI at a time. 
• Three POIs all at once in a concentrated location. 
• Three POIs surrounding the surveillance area and monitoring 
simultaneously. 
The utilization of a threat size of only one and three persons in this scenario was 
chosen for an initial requirement with the expectation for future scalability.  The system 
must be able to perform the previous threat detection operations while also constantly 
maintaining an accurate muster of all personnel on the ship. 
7. Metrics 
To properly determine if the system can successfully fill the capability gap, a set 
of key metrics needs to be developed prior to running the simulations.  The key metrics 
that were chosen are listed in Table 2.  These metrics were created by first referencing the 
Naval Tasks (NTA) in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual, Universal Joint 
Task List (UJTL) (current to May 13, 2003) and then by refining the specifics in order to 
meet the requirements.  The metrics chosen here are used within the simulation to map 
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the requirements and functions to the actual system component selection.  The 
simulations of the scenario are also used to validate the functional architecture of the 
system.  The metrics one derives from the simulation are used to study the development 
of requirements that will map to function and eventually the physical form of the 
instantiated system solution. 
Metric # Metric Type Description of Metric Supporting Document
M1 Percent Of POIs accurately identified. NTA 2.2 Collect Data and Intelligence 
M2 Percent Of KFPs accurately identified. NTA 2.2 Collect Data and Intelligence 
M3 Seconds Time required to obtain valid facial image. 
NTA 2.2 Collect Data 
and Intelligence 
M4 Seconds Time required to identify valid facial image. 
NTA 2.2 Collect Data 
and Intelligence 
M5 Percent Of POI alerts judged to be useable by Force Protection Personnel. 
NTA 2.4.1 Evaluate 
Information 
Table 2.   List of Metrics (From UJTL, 2003) 
8. Mission Success Requirements 
Mission success requirements are based on the functions required of a specific 
operational activity.  All mission requirements must be completed successfully for a 
successful mission.  The activities identified for the success of this DRM are measured in 
these categories: 
• Manage Sensors 
• Detect POI 
• Detect KFP 
• Detect UKP 
• Report POI 
• Muster Ships Personnel  
• Transfer Data 
• Provide Appropriate Alerts 
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9. Mission Definition  
To complete the mission success levels, all operational activities are utilized.  
Each mission included within a DRM scenario can be decomposed into the individual 
operational activities necessary to complete the tasks that the DRM scenario requires.  
The Joint and Naval Capability Terminology List is a compilation of Joint and Navy 
capabilities areas.  The Joint Capability Areas (JCAs) are broken into War fighting 
Mission Areas (WMA), which include Joint Training, Command & Control, Force 
Application, Force Protection, Focused Logistics, Battlespace Awareness and Force 
Management. The Naval capabilities are taken from the Naval Power 21, which is a 
combination of Sea Power 21 and Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Capabilities. Naval 
Power 21 has five pillars, which are Sea Shield, Sea Strike, Sea Basing, Expeditionary 
Maneuver Warfare, and FORCEnet (ASN RDA, CHENG, 2007).  
The mission within Sea Shield that will be focused upon are Force Protection as 
seen in Table 3.  The JCAs that are supported are “Joint Net-Centric Operations” and 
“Joint Battlespace Awareness.”  The specific JCAs applicable to this DRM are listed in 
Table 4.  This system supports the FORCEnet Communication and 
Networks/Infrastructure and Battlespace Awareness/ISR Naval capabilities.  The specific 
FORCEnet capabilities are listed in Table 5.  
 
Sea Shield 




Preventative measures taken to 
mitigate hostile actions against 
Department of Defense personnel, 
resources, facilities, and critical 
information  Force Protection does 
not include actions to defeat the 
enemy or protect against accidents, 
weather, or disease. (JP 1-02) 
 
 
Protect Against SOF and 
Terrorist Threats 
 




Table 4.   Joint Capability Areas (From ASN RDA,CHENG, 2007) 
 
Table 5.   FORCEnet Mission Capabilities (From ASN RDA,CHENG, 2007) 
10. Operational Activities  
In any of these situations, the system will respond by completing specific tasks 
when suspicious activity, a crew member, or a terrorist is positively identified.  The 
Operational Activities that were taken from the Common Operational Activities List 
(COAL), Version 2 from 2007, because they provide linkage back to standard 
documents.  The Operational Activities identified are listed below. 
• Manage sensors and information processing (2.0 ID 459) 
• Understand the situation (2.0 ID 950) 
• Recognize threats (2.0 ID 951) 
• Observe and Collect (2.0 ID 519) 
• Task Sensor (2.0 ID 522) 
• Control Sensor (2.0 ID 525) 
• Collect and Transport Sensor Derived Data (2.0 ID 530) 
• Collect Data (2.0 ID 544) 
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• Collect Contact Data (2.0 ID 545) 
• Monitor the Area of Interest (AOI) (2.0 ID 612) 
• Find Target of Interest (2.0 ID 613) 
• Identify/Recognize Target of Interest (2.0 ID 614) 
An example of the expectation of the use of the operational activities “Collect 
Data” represents the collection of all data in the pier area of the ship.  This operational 
activity relates to the data required to be collected in order to identify the people observed 
in the pier and quarterdeck area.  Now that the Operational Activities have been 
identified, the Operational Tasks necessary to achieve the mission can be identified. 
11. Operational Tasks 
During its missions, the system will be guided by Operational Tasks in 
performance of the Operational Activities necessary to achieve the Mission Success 
Requirements.  The Operational Tasks Naval Tasks (NTA) for the DRM, from the Navy 
Tactical Task List (NTTL) 3.0 and the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) that have been 
identified are listed below. 
• Communicate Information (NTA 5.1.1) 
• Conduct Collection Planning and Directing (NTA 2.1.3) 
• Collect Target Information (NTA 2.2.1) 
• Perform Tactical Reconnaissance (NTA 2.2.3.2) 
Once all operational activities have been identified, the functions necessary to 
achieve the mission are identified and documented. 
12. Mission Execution  
Executing the mission consists of completing certain tasks that can be traced back 
to their respective operational activities.  Two missions relating to this DRM are as 
follows: 
• Identifying a terrorist in within 200 yards of the ship 
• Mustering of ships crew as they board and depart the ship 
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13. Operational Concept 
The operational concept is defined from both the high-level operational activities 
and the missions those activities are required to perform.  In order to accomplish this, it is 
necessary to scope and bound the mission.  Therefore, it is determined that the 
architecture must consist of only those activities required to perform the data collection 
and analysis on the personnel within the immediate area of the ship and the ship 
quarterdeck.  Alerts are then to be issued to the watch standers for any assumed POIs.  
The Command and Control of the ships alert response are considered external to the 
system and beyond the scope of its architecture.  Additionally, the transmission of data to 
any off ship asset is also considered outside the scope of this architecture and thus not 
modeled here. 
In summary, a DRM has been established that provides the need and the context 
in which the solution must operate.  Additionally, requirements and links back to 
established Navy requirements have been created.  The DRM provides the basis for 
development of generic system architecture covered in Chapter IV.   
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IV. GENERIC SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
The generic system architecture is represented on the top left side of the Systems 
Engineering “V” (system level design requirements and architecture).  The generic 
architecture provides a general set of criteria, requirements, and functional 
decompositions to allow for creation of a solution to the capability gap or need.  This 
chapter provides the high level operational concept graphic, an external systems diagram, 
the functional architecture hierarchy, and decomposition diagrams for the generic 
architecture that allows for the system to successfully address the scenario described in 
the DRM.   
A. OPERATIONAL VIEW (OV)   
The Operational View (OV) figure is a high-level operational concept graphic that 
provides a concise pictorial describing the mission the proposed system is to perform 
(Department of Defense, 2007).  Figure 12 depicts the OV that is based on the DRM.  
This figure shows the simplified diagram of the operating area from Figure 4 with 
overlays of the cameras field of views (FOV). Within the camera FOVs the two stars (one 
red and one blue) represent the locations of two separate persons.  The image of a person 
(in the FOV with the blue star) correlated as a KFP is displayed in the top left.  The 




Figure 12.   System Operational View 
B. EXTERNAL SYSTEMS DIAGRAM (ESD) 
The Integrated Definition for Function Modeling (IDEF0) format is utilized in the 
modeling a system solution.  The following system diagrams are based on this format 
starting with the external systems diagram.  An external systems diagram (ESD) is 
defined as the model of the interaction of the system with other (external) systems in the 
relevant contexts, thus providing a definition of the system’s boundary in terms of the 
system’s inputs and outputs (Buede, 2000, 433).  Figure 13 displays the external systems 
diagram (ESD) created from the DRM and illustrates the top-level function of providing 
pier monitoring and mustering services.  The ESD is broken down into constraints 
(represented by arrows going in from the top), inputs (represented by arrows coming in 




functions (represented by arrows coming in from the bottom).  Systems are listed at the 
bottom of the diagram, with arrows going up into a box, representing the top-level 
function of the corresponding system. 
  
Figure 13.   External Systems Diagram 
C. REQUIREMENTS 
Requirements are established by agreements between all stakeholders of the 
system.  The main stakeholders to establish requirements for a system on LCS were 
determined to be the end-user, commanders of LCS ships, proposed system contractor, 
LCS ship contractor, and the program executive officer for the LCS ship program.  The 
stakeholders are to establish requirements based on the concept of operations for the 
system design.  It was decided that due to time constraints the actual stakeholders input 
would not be solicited, but rather the requirements presented here are based on the DRM, 
the ESD, determining what is needed so that the system to be built can successfully 
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complete the mission, and personal experience achieved while working with the LCS 
program.  The operational needs listed below come from the DRM:  
• Provide situational awareness around pier-tied ship at a minimum distance 
of 200 yards from the ship.  
• Provide ability to monitor pier area and alert watch standers of possible 
threats. 
• Provide interface with existing LCS infrastructure (e.g., cameras, power, 
FPO). 
• Provide a real time crew mustering capability. 
The aforementioned operational needs and the External Systems Diagram are 
translated into high-level requirements, as follows: 
C. Requirements  
C.1.0—Input/output requirements 
C.1.1—Input requirements 
C.1.1.1—The system shall receive raw video data from existing 
external LCS cameras. 
C.1.1.2—The system shall receive a muster request from the user. 
C.1.1.3—The system shall receive alert recognition from the user. 
C.1.1.4—The system shall receive data from the user. 
C.1.1.5—The system shall receive electrical power from the ship. 
C.1.2—Output requirements 
C.1.2.1—The system shall provide POI alerts to the user. 
C.1.2.2—The system shall provide camera pan/tilt/zoom control to 
the LCS cameras. 
C.1.2.3—The system shall provide muster report of ships 
personnel to user. 
C.2.0—External systems requirements 
C.2.1—The system shall interface with the user. 
C.2.2—The system shall interface with existing external LCS cameras. 
C.2.3—The system shall interface with the ship. 
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C.2.4—The system shall interface with the database update system. 
C.3.0—System constraint requirements 
C.3.1— The system shall comply with constraints of ships standards. 
C.3.2—The system is constrained by obstructions and structures on the 
pier.  
C.3.3— The system is constrained by people on the pier and quarterdeck 
providing a view to the video cameras of their face.  
C.4.0—The system requirements 
C.4.1—The system shall provide situational awareness around pier-tied 
ship at a minimum distance of 200 yards from the ship.  
C.4.2—The system shall provide ability to monitor pier area and alert 
watch standers of possible threats. 
C.4.3—The system shall provide interface with existing LCS 
infrastructure (e.g., cameras, power, FPO). 
C.4.3—The system shall provide a real time crew mustering capability. 
D. GENERIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
The functional architecture of a system contains a hierarchical model of the 
functions performed by the generic system and a functional architecture decomposition 
(Buede, 2009).  In order to allow for successful building and implementation of a system 
that could successfully complete the scenario formulated in the Design Reference 
Mission, an extensive evaluation was conducted and the resulting functional architecture 
hierarchy is illustrated in Figure 14.  This functional architecture hierarchy is utilized to 




Figure 14.   Generic Functional Architecture Hierarchy 
The functional architecture states the following four required functions should be 





• Log in Database 
Utilizing the IDEF0 modeling process, the functional architecture hierarchy from 
Figure 14 is decomposed starting at the top function and moving down functions level by 
level.  This decomposition shows functions at each level with inputs, outputs, and 
constraints that trace back to the ESD of Figure 14.  The top-level function of providing 
pier monitoring and mustering services for the generic system is depicted in Figure 15.  
This IDEF0 decomposition diagram shows that the function performed is inside the 
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block.  The inputs to the function come in from the left, the constraints come in from the 




Figure 15.   Top-level Function for the Generic System 
The top-level function is then broken down into the first level decomposition 
provided in Figure 16.  This first level decomposition shows the interactions of the first 
level from the functional architecture hierarchy individual functions.   
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Figure 16.   First-level Decomposition of the System Function Provide Pier 
Monitoring and Mustering Services 
Figure 17 provides the decomposition of the Detect Function.  This depiction 
displays how the Detect Function takes the raw video data and scans for an image of a 
person.  It then takes that image of a person and looks for the location of the face.  Next, 
the facial image is processed and normalized with the output being a facial image.   
Note: In the case of scanning the pier area, there may be more than one person in the 
camera’s field of view.  Thus, the scan function includes scanning the camera’s video 
frames for faces, in addition to scanning the pier monitoring area. 
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Figure 17.   Decomposition of Detect Function 
Figure 18 depicts the decomposition of the Normalize Face Function.  This 
decomposition displays how the Normalize Face Function takes the location of the 
persons face and creates pan and tilt commands as needed.  Then, once the pan and tilt is 
complete, the zoom command executes until complete.  The final step is to output the 
extracted facial image.   
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Figure 18.   Decomposition of Normalize Face Function 
Figure 19 depicts the decomposition of the Identify Function.  This depiction 
displays how the Identify Function takes the facial image of the person and identifies 
whether it is a POI, a KFP or a UKP.  This function outputs the database classification of 




Figure 19.   Decomposition of Identify Function 
Figure 20 depicts the decomposition of the Provide Database Update Function.  
This depiction displays how the Provide Database Update Function takes the identity of 
the facial image and determines whether it is a POI, KFP, or UKP.  The output is the 




Figure 20.   Decomposition of Provide Database Update Function 
Figure 21 depicts the decomposition of the Alert Function.  This depiction 
displays how the Alert Function takes the identified facial image and provides an 




Figure 21.   Decomposition of Alert Function 
Figure 22 depicts the decomposition of the Log in Database Function.  This 
decomposition displays how the Log in Database Function takes the three different 
identifications, KFP, POI, and UKP, and updates the appropriate database.  The output is 
a properly maintained and accurate status of each database.   
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Figure 22.   Decomposition of Log in Database Function 
In summary, a generic architecture for the development of a system that addresses 
the capability gap described in the DRM was presented.  Initially, a high-level 
operational view was provided.  Using IDEF0 modeling an External Systems Diagram 
was created and generic requirements were provided.  A functional architecture hierarchy 
and functional architecture decomposition was developed and captured using IDEF0.  
Chapter V continues the Systems Engineering process by presenting an analysis of 
alternatives, concept for the proposed solution, a brief explanation of facial recognition 
theory, the proposed system architecture, a physical architecture, and a proof-of-concept 
system is demonstrated and validated for viability.   
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V. PROPOSED SYSTEM SOLUTION 
The pier security of LCS class ships and the mustering of their personnel are 
important to the overall security of the ship. This chapter discusses how to further design 
the system using the Systems Engineering “V” model to meet the operational need.   The 
creation of the generic system architecture was presented in Chapter IV.  The next step in 
applying the Systems Engineering “V” model is to conduct an analysis of alternatives to 
evaluate potential solutions.  From these potential solutions, an alternative is selected as 
the proposed solution.  The proposed solution is further developed in updating the generic 
functional architecture and requirements.  From the updated functional architectures and 
requirements, an instantiated physical architecture is developed for this proposed 
solution.  Additionally, this chapter provides a brief discussion on the theory behind the 
proposed solution.  Next, the proposed solution is further developed, implemented, and 
tested through a proof-of-concept system.  Finally, lessons learned and conclusions 
drawn from the Pier Watchman Proof-of-Concept System are discussed. 
A. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
Analysis of Alternatives is a process that looks at the required need, concept, 
ESD, requirements, and functional architecture to identify potentially viable solutions.  
Assessments are performed on each possible solution evaluating for effectiveness, 
achievability, cost, and viability (United States Air Force, 2008).   
An extensive list of alternatives could be provided that could fulfill the need 
established in the DRM and the generic architecture presented in Chapter IV.  A potential 
alternative may include incorporating additional personnel to satisfy all functions 
including face detection, identification, alerting, and logging in the database.  Other 
alternatives might incorporate alternative biometric sensors for automatic personnel 
identification, such as fingerprint scanning.  Due to time and budget constraints, this 
thesis will focus on one alternative that utilizes facial recognition technology as the basis 
for an autonomous mustering and pier monitoring system.  By utilizing existing sensors 
and adding only one more camera, the proposed system concept leverages the existing 
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LCS systems and infrastructure while not adding additional manning.  As discussed in 
Chapter I, Ship Class General Information Section (Section B), minimal manning and 
maximum automation is a goal in LCS design.  Subsequently, the remainder of the 
systems engineering process in this thesis focuses on this one proposed alternative. 
B. PROPOSED SYSTEM CONCEPT 
The concept for the proposed solution came out of two experiences of working 
with LCS-1 and participating in the Artificial Intelligence Systems Engineering courses I 
and II given during the fall quarter of 2008 and the spring quarter of 2009 at Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) Network-Centric Systems Engineering Track, taught by 
Professor Rachel Goshorn.  During these courses the class designed, built, coded, 
debugged, tested, integrated, and demonstrated an autonomous mustering and behavior 
analysis system called “Watchman.”  This system utilized fixed view cameras, personnel 
tracking, behavior analysis, and facial recognition software to monitor the second story of 
the Bullard Hall building at NPS.  The system would attempt to capture a facial image as 
soon as a person climbed the stairs and came onto the second floor.  This image would 
then be autonomously processed and correlated in an attempt to muster the person into 
the system (Goshorn, 2009). 
In support of the AOA, the proposed solution concept came about during 
construction of the Watchman system.  While constructing this system it was determined 
that a similar network-centric system was both needed and could be easily adapted to the 
Freedom class of ships.  Personal experience provided insight into the fact that the 
Freedom class of ships already had external cameras similar to those in Watchman, with 
a pan, tilt, and zoom capability and operated in all weather conditions.  Additionally, after 
a careful review, a decision was made to recommend that the proposed solution for LCS 
ships be autonomous.  To further investigate the feasibility of building and installing an 
autonomous pier security and mustering system onto the Freedom class of ships, an 
instantiated physical architecture was developed and demonstrated.  The next sections 
describe the proposed mustering and force protection processes including a brief 
background of face recognition technology. 
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C. THE PROPOSED MUSTERING AND FORCE PROTECTION 
PROCESSES 
Along with providing constant crew status, the utilization of an automated 
mustering system alleviates some of the administrative burden associated with executing 
the existing manual system.  The proposed system continually monitors and maintains the 
local LCS mustering databases.  The result is that every person coming onto and leaving 
the ship would be automatically identified and mustered.  This provides a quick and 
accurate muster of who is onboard the ship.  The Pier Watchman Proof-of-Concept 
System demonstrates the functionality and proves that this is feasible.  A detailed 
explanation of its operation is provided in later in this chapter. 
The current force protection process, described in Chapter I, needs to be enhanced 
while the composition and number of watch standers must not increase.  The proposed 
system utilizes an autonomous set of cameras to constantly monitor the pier area.  This 
system will monitor for personnel in the vicinity of the ship.  When it identifies a person, 
it will attempt to perform a digital facial recognition of the person.  If a facial image is 
captured, the system will automatically compare that image with a database of known 
facial images and look for facial image correlation as seen in Figure 1.  If an image is 
correlated above a prescribed threshold, the system will record the person’s name, time, 
and camera in the database.  The image will then be given one of three different 
designations: Known Friendly Person (KFP), Unknown Person (UKP), and Person of 
Interest (POI).  
The known friendly images will be recorded in the database for future review if 
needed, but no further action is expected.  If the image is correlated to a known person of 
interest (e.g., terrorist), the system will provide an audible alert to the watch standers so 
that they can decide on further action.  Additionally, all information on the POI will be 
recorded in its database.  The list of POIs will be created and updated for the LCS local 
database by outside intelligence organizations.  All unknown facial images will also be 




reference the facial image without a name.  If a person who was previously identified as a 
UKP is observed, again the pertinent information is recorded under their original 
database entry.  
The system will also monitor all of the UKP persons for further information, such 
as the length of time that a UKP was monitoring the ship and whether or not he or she 
was monitoring it on more than one occasion.  The goal is to determine whether terrorist 
groups are monitoring the ship.  The proposed system would provide an alert to the watch 
standers if either a UKP breaches a threshold time (using an established threshold time) 
for monitoring the ship or a UKP is identified on multiple occasions at pier sites.  The 
watch standers will report this issue to the Force Protection Officer (FPO).  The FPO can 
then review the information and decide on further action.   
The proposed procedure for reacting to alerts for POIs or suspicious UKPs will be 
for the FPO to review the data and determine if it is a possible threat and react 
accordingly.  In the case of UKPs, the FPO will be trying to determine if the image 
captured is of an authorized individual such as a dockworker or local employee, or 
confirm if it is someone suspicious.  In the case of a POI alert, the FPO will be looking to 
ensure that the facial image that is captured looks close to the stored POI facial image.  
Any suspicious UKPs or confirmed POIs will be reported up the chain of command 
locally and then if required off the ship for resolution.  A goal of this thesis is not to set 
the exact procedure that will be utilized for suspicious UKP or POI identified persons, 
but instead to propose and establish the viability of a system that can automatically 
determine that there has been persistent or repeated monitoring of the ship.   
One area outside the scope of this thesis is the training required for this proposed 
system.  As with any new system, there will be a certain level of required training for 
both operation and maintenance of the proposed system.  The amount of training required 
will be based on the exact parameters of the final system.  Training should be discussed 
in detail prior to deployment of the system.   
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D. FACE RECOGNITION THEORY 
The proposed automated system relies heavily on the use of facial recognition 
software.  This section will provide a brief explanation of how one particular version of 
facial recognition software works.  This thesis does not prescribe which facial recognition 
program should be used for a full-scale system; the high-level functionality of any face 
recognition software is essentially the same (Turk and Pentland, 1991).  The selection of 
a facial recognition program can be made after the decision to move beyond the initial 
proof-of-concept is made.     
Video is composed of several frames (digital images) per second and a facial 
recognition algorithm can process the digital images (Baxes, 1994).  Facial recognition 
starts with the capturing of digital images with a digital camera.  The digital image 
captures the field-of-view of the camera.  A camera’s field-of-view is the two-
dimensional scene that the camera “sees.”  The digital image can be stored as matrices in 
color or in grayscale (Baxes, 1994).  If the digital image is stored in color, it is generally 
stored as three rectangular arrays of pixels (one array for each color channel: red, green, 
blue), whose pixel values are the intensity level of the specific color channel at that 
location of the camera field-of-view.  The image can also be stored with only one 
rectangular array, if using grayscale images.  In this case, the pixel values are an intensity 
of the gray value at that pixel value.  The number of pixels in an array is dependent on the 
camera resolution for the camera’s field-of-view. Each (x, y) coordinate location on this 
two-dimensional scene corresponds to a pixel location in the digital image.  Each pixel 
correlates to an actual (x, y) coordinate location of the field-of-view of the camera. 
(Baxes, 1994).  Once the scene is digitized with a digital image, it can be processed for 
automating intelligence, such as automating facial recognition.   
There are numerous algorithms and techniques for face (image) recognition, but 
in this thesis, and in the Pier Watchman proof-of-concept system, the algorithm utilized is 
based on the use of an Eigenface (Turk and Pentland, 1991).  This is based on the 
principal that every facial image in a database can be mathematically recreated 
(approximately) using a linear combination of a small number of Eigenface facial images.  
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These Eigenfaces do not look like any one person’s face, but rather like different 
skeletons of faces, each capturing a “principal component” that may be present in all 
faces of the database.  This is why each face in the database can be recreated 
(approximately) by adding or subtracting only these Eigenfaces. Eigenfaces of the 
database and of the detected face of interest are calculated by performing Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) on the images.  PCA techniques have the ability to find the 
principal vectors (or “components”) that best represent the distribution of the face within 
the captured digital image (Turk and Pentland, 1991).  Figure 23 shows a typical face 
before conversion and Figure 24 shows seven Eigenfaces created from that face.  The 
Eigenfaces of this image are correlated with the Eigenfaces of the database.  This allows 
for faster and more robust correlation, then correlating the original facial image of the 
person of interest with all of the original facial images stored in the database. 
 





Figure 24.   Seven of the Eigenfaces Calculated from Typical Face in Figure 23 (From 
Turk and Pentland, 1991, 75) 
The University of Maryland (UMD) and Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) Media Laboratory algorithm is an example of facial recognition software.  This 
algorithm utilizes Eigenface transforms, a component of Principal Component Analysis.  
Figure 25 illustrates a brief explanation of how this process works (Pentland and 
Tanzeem, 2000, 53).  In order to correlate a facial image to a database of facial images, 
the images must be compiled in the database.  Subsequently, the first step explained in 
Figure 25 is to collect the database of facial images that are then converted into sets of 
Eigenfaces through PCA.  These stored images make up the known images that can be 
used for correlation.  Facial recognition of a person is done by taking their newly 
captured image, extracting its Eigenfaces, and comparing them to the stored database of 
Eigenfaces.  In the case of the UMD and MIT algorithm, they were looking for at least a 
similarity of not less than 50% correlation.  If the images have a 50% correlation or 
better, the images would be considered to match and the person would be identified.  The 
correlation threshold is variable and application dependent based on accuracy, tolerance 




Figure 25.   UMD and MIT Eigenfaces Procedure (From Pentland and Tanzeem, 2000, 
53) 
E. PROPOSED SOLUTION FUNCTIONS 
The proposed system follows the functional architecture of the proposed system 
solution, thus it was designed with the four basic functions described in the generic 
architecture, to meet the operational need: detect, identify, alert, and log in database.  
Figure 26 reviews the simplified functional architecture diagram from the generic 
architecture as applied to the proposed system solution providing the functional 
workflows for the system.  A proof-of-concept system must be able to perform these 
functions in order to be successful. 
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Figure 26.   Proposed Proof-of-Concept Functional Architecture Diagram 
F. PROPOSED SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
Expanding upon the generic functional architecture hierarchy and adapting it to 
proposed solution of an automated solution, results in updating the functional architecture 
decomposition system components and further decomposition of the detect face and 
recognize face functions highlighted in Figure 27 and the following functional 
architecture decomposition figures.  The proposed solution utilizes the entire functional 
hierarchy with the requirement that the functions be automated.  Therefore, additional 




Figure 27.   Functional Architecture Hierarchy for the Proposed System 
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In Figures 28–34 the generic architecture decompositions have been modified to 
reflect the use of automation (highlighted in each figure).  Figures 35–36 are proposed 
system functional architecture decompositions that further decompose the functions 
highlighted in Figure 27.  The first level decomposition of the proposed solution is 
provided in Figure 28.   
 
 
Figure 28.   First-level Decomposition of the System Function for the Proposed 
System 




Figure 29.   Decomposition of Detect Function for the Proposed System 
Figure 30 provides the decomposition of the Normalize Face Function for the 
proposed solution.   
 
Figure 30.   Decomposition of Normalize Face Function for the Proposed System 
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Figure 31 provides the decomposition of the Identify Function for the proposed 
solution.   
 
 
Figure 31.   Decomposition of Identify Function for the Proposed System 
Figure 32 provides the decomposition of the Provide Database Update Function 





Figure 32.   Decomposition of Provide Database Update Function for the Proposed 
System 






Figure 33.   Decomposition of Alert Function for the Proposed System 
Figure 34 provides the decomposition of the Detect Function for the proposed 
solution.   
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Figure 34.   Decomposition of Log in Database Function for the Proposed System 
Figure 35 depicts the decomposition of the Detect Face Function.  This depiction 
displays how the Detect Face Function takes the image of the person and generates the 
coordinates for the face within the image of the person.  The Detect Face Function then 









Figure 35.   Decomposition of Detect Face Function for the Proposed System 
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Figure 36 depicts the decomposition of the Recognize Face Function.  This 
depiction displays how the Recognize Face Function takes the facial image and turns it 
into eigenvectors.  These eigenvectors are then put into a matrix so that the current facial 
image matrix and the matrix of the updated database can be compared to a stored set of 
matrices (stored in the local database) that correlate to a known facial image.  Once a 
correlation is established, the facial image is tagged with the identity of that facial image. 
 
Figure 36.   Decomposition of Recognize Face Function for the Proposed System 
The decompositions of each of the expanded functions demonstrate how an 
automated system could conform to the generic architecture with minimal additions. 
G. REQUIREMENTS 
The requirements established in the generic architecture can be adapted to meet 
the proposed system solution by adding line items specific to the automation functions.  
The proposed system requirements are listed below: 
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G.  Requirements 
G.1.0—Input/output requirements 
G.1.1—Input requirements 
G.1.1.1—The system shall receive raw video data from existing 
external LCS cameras. 
G.1.1.2— The system shall receive a muster request from the user. 
G.1.1.3— The system shall receive alert recognition from the user. 
G.1.1.4—The system shall receive data from the user. 
G.1.1.5—The system shall receive electrical power from the ship. 
G.1.2—Output requirements 
G.1.2.1— The system shall provide POI alerts to the user. 
G.1.2.2 — The system shall provide camera pan/tilt/zoom control 
to the LCS cameras. 
G.1.2.3— The system shall provide muster report of ships 
personnel to user. 
G.2.0—External systems requirements 
G.2.1—The system shall interface with the user. 
G.2.2—The system shall interface with existing external LCS cameras. 
G.2.3—The system shall interface with the ship. 
G.2.4—The system shall interface with the database update system. 
G.3.0—System constraint requirements 
G.3.1— The system shall comply with constraints of ships standards. 
G.3.2—The system is constrained by obstructions and structures on the 
pier.  
G.3.3— The system is constrained by people on the pier and quarterdeck 
providing a view to the video cameras of their face.  
G.4.0—The system requirements 
G.4.1— The system shall provide situational awareness around pier-tied 
ship at a minimum distance of 200 yards from the ship.  
G.4.2— The system shall provide ability to monitor pier area and alert 
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watch standers of possible threats. 
G.4.3 — The system shall provide interface with existing LCS 
infrastructure (e.g., cameras, power, FPO). 
G.4.4 — The system shall provide a real time crew mustering capability. 
G.4.5— The system shall provide an alert function and, when appropriate, 
monitor and alert watch standers of possible threats. 
G.4.6 — The system shall operate and manage system assets 
autonomously, including autonomous facial recognition and mustering to 
minimize human supervision/control/support. 
G.4.7 — The system shall process data autonomously to provide a 
knowledge base for the ship watch standers allowing them to make 
informed decisions. 
G.4.8 — Provide facial recognition accuracy of a minimum of 60% 
(matches images obtained to correct images in database 60% of the time). 
G.4.9 — Provide, at a minimum, enough processing capability to correlate 
an image to a database of 5,000 images in 5 seconds. 
G.4.10 — Provide a networking capability that meets the Ethernet 
networking standard IEEE 802.3. 
G.4.11 — Provide a database that performs the following: 
• Maintains a mustering status and provides report. 
• Provides alerts for Persons of Interest. 
• Has the ability to be updated periodically to add or delete 
both KFPs and POIs. 
• Maintain a UKP list with unique identifiers for each UKP. 
H. APPLICATION OF THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS TO THE 
PIER WATCHMAN PROOF-OF-CONCEPT SYSTEM 
Chapter II discussed the System Engineering “V” that was utilized in designing 
the Pier Watchman System.  The creation of the Pier Watchman Proof-of-Concept 
System took the design that was created on the left side of the “V” and performed the 
fabrication, integration, and testing prescribed on the right side of the “V.”  The intention 
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was to validate a specific, proposed solution design on a small scale, ensuring a particular 
system would be feasible for large-scale production.  
I. PURPOSE FOR PROOF-OF-CONCEPT SYSTEM 
From a careful review of the proposed system concept, there appeared to be a 
technology gap in the ability to autonomously provide pier security and mustering.  To 
show that the proposed full-scale system for autonomously performing facial detection, 
facial recognition, mustering, and area monitoring is a viable solution to enhancing 
situational awareness and force protection, it was decided that a small-scale prototype 
system should be designed and implemented.  This system needed to emulate the existing 
set-up for LCS but did not require the use of the exact hardware from LCS. 
The Pier Watchman proof-of-concept system was designed and built to be a smart 
surveillance system that utilizes one camera to perform face recognition.  This one 
camera acts as a prototype for both the existing LCS cameras and the proposed 
quarterdeck area camera.  The system design allows for expandability.  The camera used 
in this system has a pan/tilt/zoom (PTZ) functionality that allows for capturing and 
processing of images.  This video processing is capable of performing blob analysis 
(object detection), face detection, and face recognition on the captured video and then 
relaying this data to the server for integration into its high-level analysis.   
J. PROOF-OF-CONCEPT SYSTEM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION  
This section initially reviews the potential components in the functional full-scale 
proposed system.  Then it compares components with the instantiated Pier Watchman 
Proof-of-Concept System.  The components for the full-scale system would consist of the 
cameras already installed on LCS, the addition of one quarterdeck camera, a database 
server, workstation computers, and interface with the existing LCS computer network to 
obtain the images captured by the cameras.  All of these components would need to be 
networked into a cohesive computer network.  This network would have dedicated 
software for each camera’s video feed (possibly multiple computers) and one main server 
to contain and process the facial image databases and alerts. 
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Before fabrication could begin, a suitable camera needed to be selected that could 
emulate the current cameras on LCS.  The external cameras that are presently installed on 
LCS-1 are Spectra III, outdoor long-range cameras model number PE-SD53CBW-PREO 
produced by the Pelco Company (Hurley, 2010).  The camera chosen to emulate the 
Spectra III was the Sony SNCRZ30N PTZ.  The Sony camera was chosen due to similar 
functionality to Spectra III and that the Sony camera was previously purchased for the 
NCSE lab.  The Sony camera is not weather proof, but this feature was not vital for the 
lab-based proof-of-concept system.  Table 6 provides the specifications for the existing 
LCS cameras and the specifications for the camera chosen to emulate them in the Pier 
Watchman Proof-of-Concept System. 
Option Camera Resolution Zoom Degrees of Pan Degrees of Tilt Indoor/Outdoor
LCS Spectra III 724 X 494 23 X 360 94 (+2 to -92) Yes 
COTS Sony 736 X 480 25 X 340 115 No 
Table 6.   LCS/ Pier Watchman Camera Specification Table (Pelco, 2009) (Sony, 
2009) 
The plan for the proof-of-concept system was to emulate only one camera with its 
dedicated computer, the server computer, and all network interfaces needed to integrate 
these components.  Physically, the infrastructure for Pier Watchman proof-of-concept 
system consisted of the following hardware components with physical connections as per 
Figure 37: 
• 1 Sony Model: SNCRZ30N PTZ camera.  
• 1 Dell Latitude Model: D820 laptop computer.  
• 1 D-Link DSS-5+ Ethernet switch.  
• 1 MAC server. 
• Local Area Network (LAN) 
K. INSTANTIATED PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE AND NETWORK 
CONSTRUCTION  
The instantiated physical architecture for the proof-of concept system is shown in 
Figure 37.  Figure 37 provides a schematic for how the components are integrated.  This 
includes portraying how the Sony camera captures the raw video and transfers it to the 
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network switch through Category Five (CAT5) network cabling.  Then the raw video data 
routes through the switch to the laptop computer through CAT5 cabling.  The raw video 
data is processed on the Dell laptop for face detection and recognition, and if a face is 
detected then PTZ commands are sent back to the switch through CAT5 cabling.  From 
the switch, the PTZ commands are sent to the camera through CAT5 cabling.  The 
camera then pan, tilts, and or zooms into the location ordered by the laptop.  The camera 
captures the zoomed in area and this raw video data is sent back to the laptop through the 
switch as described earlier.  Once zoomed in and a valid facial image has been sent to the 
laptop computer, automatic facial recognition is attempted on the facial image.  The 
laptop assigns an identity to the facial image with a confidence level and then sends it to 
the switch as a database update through CAT5 cabling.  (Note the identity may be tagged 
“unknown” if a face doesn’t fit the facial database.)  From the switch, the database update 
is transferred to the server through CAT5 cabling.  Additionally, the server can also pull 
additional data from the laptop as required through the switch and the associated CAT5 
cabling mentioned earlier. 
 
Figure 37.   Instantiated Physical Architecture of Pier Watchman Proof-of-Concept 
System 
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The Pier Watchman Proof-of-Concept System was networked incrementally to 
ensure that each component would function properly and was correctly integrated prior to 
moving to integration of the next component.  Initially, the Sony camera and Dell laptop 
were networked together through the switch.  Once the testing for proper operation of 
both was verified, the server was connected to the switch and its proper operation was 
verified.  The coding of the supporting software was started in conjunction with the 
completion of this initial setup. 
L. SOFTWARE UTILIZED 
An important aspect of creating the Pier Watchman Proof-of-Concept System was 
acquiring the necessary software that would be capable of meeting the design 
requirements.  This design required a software capability to perform facial detection, 
recognition, and file transfer capabilities.  Table 7 provides the list of software that the 
Pier Watchman Proof-of-Concept System utilized and their function. 
Software Name Function 
MATLAB Performed Facial Detection, Recognition 
Golden FTP Server 
(Freeware Version) 
File Transfer Program to transfer captured Facial image to 
server for processing. 
Sony Camera Software Provides interface and control of Sony camera and its pan tilt zoom capabilities 
Microsoft Windows XP Operating System for Dell Laptop 
Microsoft Access  Database Processing 
Table 7.   Software Utilized in the Fabrication of Pier Watchman Proof-of-Concept 
System 
M. PIER WATCHMAN PROGRAM DESIGN LANGUAGE (PDL) 
The coding for the Pier Watchman software started utilizing a basic program 
design language (PDL) syntax that allowed for establishment of a logical structure.  PDL 
allows the programmer to use the English language in an expressive manor while still 
maintaining the logical structure of a programming language (Pressman, 2010).  The 
initial PDL that was written for Pier Watchman is provided in Appendix A. 
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N. PIER WATCHMAN SOURCE CODE 
The aforementioned PDL code was then transferred into actual source code 
utilizing MathWorks MATLAB software. The source code that was written for Pier 
Watchman Proof-of-Concept System is provided in Appendix B. Additionally, the 
instructions for operating the Pier Watchman Proof-of-Concept System are provided as a 
specific set of startup procedures and are provided in Appendix C.  
O. SYSTEM OPERATION 
Basic functions of the system operation are for the camera and laptop to capture 
images and perform the facial detection.  The facial detection function consists of the 
computer first localizing a person within the field of view of its associated camera.  Then 
the facial detection algorithm provides pan, tilt, and or zoom commands for the camera to 
modify the camera’s field of view to solely capture what is believed to be the face of the 
person in question.  The camera captures what is assumed to be a facial image and saves 
it to a file folder.  Finally, the assumed facial image is processed by the facial recognition 
algorithm, looking for a positive match.   
For better understanding of the proof-of-concept system, the following figures 
provide a systematic display of the system in operation.  The scenario is that a test subject 
enters the lab and approaches the proof-of-concept system, taking a seat within ten feet of 
the camera.  Figures 38–41 demonstrate the face detection functions of the proof-of-
concept system by displaying temporal snapshots of the camera field of view.  Figure 38 
is an image captured by the proof-of-concept system that displays the actual field of view 
of the camera.  Figure 39 displays that same field of view with the test subject having 
entered the room and preparing to sit down.  Figure 40 shows the person sitting down.  
The system prepares to pan, tilt, and zoom into the face.  Figure 41 displays the facial 




Figure 38.   Snapshot #1: Initial Field of View of the Proof-of-Concept System 
 
 









Figure 41.   Snapshot #4: Facial Image Captured 
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Following face detection the facial recognition algorithm is enacted.  Facial 
recognition consists of comparing the captured image with a database of known images 
and providing a best match with a percent of correlation, or confidence.  If a correlation 
above an adjustable confidence threshold (e.g., 60%) occurs, the identity of the 
“matched” individual is provided.  Additionally, if the identity is a KFP (e.g., known 
crewmember), then that person is mustered as present.  Alternatively, if the identity 
displayed is a POI (e.g., terrorist), then the system reacts by providing an appropriate 
alert.  Finally, if the “closest” match to the facial database yields a correlation or 
confidence level under threshold, then the identity displayed is that of a UKP (e.g., 
unknown). 
To demonstrate the facial recognition feature of the proof-of-concept system, 
Figures 42 and 43 provide a systematic proof-of-concept of this process.  First, Figure 42 
displays a subset of facial images from the proof-of-concept database.  These images are 
examples of known persons in the database.  They represent only a few of the images that 
the system would compare against when looking for a match.  Figure 43 displays two 
images: the captured face on the left under “Looking for” and the image it correlates to 
with its associated confidence level on the right. 
 
 




Figure 43.   Correlation of the Facial Image to the Image from the Database 
P. PROOF-OF-CONCEPT SYSTEM OPERATION AND TESTING 
To properly evaluate operation and capability of the proof-of-concept system, an 
acceptance test was developed.  The acceptance test utilized for the Pier Watchman 
Proof-of-Concept System subsequently is summarized below. 
1. The test will be performed utilizing two separate personnel.  The personnel will 
have their images entered into the database with one listed as a POI and one as a 
KFP.  The personnel will then approach the Pier Watchman System one at a time 
and stand at three locations designated by markers on the floor at distances of five 
feet, ten feet, and fifteen feet away from the Pier Watchman Proof-of-Concept 
System. 
2. While the test subjects are doing the aforementioned procedures the individual 
conducting the test will observe the following: 
a. The camera detects the movement of the person. 
b. The camera detects the face of the person. 
c. The camera zooms in to capture a face image. 
d. A valid picture is obtained. 
e. The valid picture is properly transferred to the Dell workstation. 
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3. The Dell workstation will conduct facial recognition, and assignment of POI or 
KFP and mustering of the person (as applicable).  The Pier Watchman Proof-of-
Concept System returns the name of the person and the correlation factor that the 
correct name was selected. 
The system will have successfully completed the test if: 
• The test subject’s face is detected. 
• The Pier Watchman System Pans, Tilts, and Zooms in on the test subject’s 
face. 
• The face detected is successfully matched to a database record with an 
accuracy of 60% or greater. 
• Each time a KFP is identified, it is accurately mustered.  
• Each time a POI is identified, an alarm is indicated. 
This acceptance test was completed ten times at each distance on two different 
subjects (one defined as a POI and one defined as a KFP).  Table 8 provides the results 
from the acceptance testing. 
Distance 
5ft 10ft 15ft Test Subject 
Sat Unsat Sat Unsat Sat Unsat 
Stubblefield (POI) 10 0 8 2 8 2 
DeDeaux (KFP) 9 1 9 1 7 3 
Individual Distance 
Success Rate 95% 85% 75% 
Individual Distance 
Failure Rate 5% 15% 25% 
Overall Success Rate 85% 
Note: Each Test Subject carried out 10 tests at each distance of 5ft, 10ft, and 15ft. 
(Sat=satisfactory, Unsat=unsatisfactory) 
 
Table 8.   The Pier Watchman Proof-of-Concept Acceptance Test Results 
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The overall success rate of 85% is higher than the required 60% that was selected 
for successful completion. However, the original successful completion of 60% was 
based on automated facial detection, image capturing, and correct facial recognition and 
not just correctly zooming into the face and capturing the facial image.  Due to a 
communication error between two software programs, the system could not automatically 
transfer the captured images to the facial recognition program.  To accurately test the 
facial recognition function the facial images captured from the Acceptance test were 
manually processed through the facial recognition software. This resulted in a 100% 
success rate in accurately identifying the person, but it was decided to evaluate and judge 
system effectiveness without these test results until future work could successfully make 
this feature work without user interaction as originally planned.  
Q. LESSONS LEARNED WHILE DESIGNING, BUILDING, AND TESTING 
THE PIER WATCHMAN PROOF-OF-CONCEPT SYSTEM 
Before construction began, the design was verified multiple times to ensure that it 
met the desired goals. To be successful, there needed to be a clear understanding of how 
each piece interacted with each other.  By utilizing the Systems Engineering process and 
ensuring the design was mature and ready the implementation and programming of the 
proof-of-concept system went smoothly.  Because the initial groundwork was performed 
thoroughly, the initial proof-of-concept system was constructed, networked, coded, 
compiled, and tested quickly. 
Issues did arise within the code associated with Commercial Off-the-Shelf 
(COTS) products when attempting to communicate with each other. After some intensive 
troubleshooting, it was discovered that if a specific start-up procedure, provided in 
Appendix C, was followed, all components could properly communicate with each other. 
However, the File Transfer Protocol (FTP) server was unable to send its files across the 
network to the Dell workstation. The problem was linked to a lack of operability with the 
freeware version of FTP server that was obtained.  This was not seen as a major issue, 
and a workaround was established that allowed system operability to be evaluated.  The 
workaround was that after the detected facial image was captured, it was manually fed 
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into the facial recognition function.  Despite the minor deviation from the original plan, 
the proof-of-concept system demonstration was deemed successful.  
R. CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM PROOF-OF-CONCEPT SYSTEM 
The Pier Watchman Proof-of-Concept System built provides valuable insight into 
a full-scale proposed automated solution for mustering and pier security for LCS ships.  It 
proved the feasibility and functionality of the systems engineering design.  First, the Pier 
Watchman Proof-of-Concept System proved the ability of the system to detect a person 
within the camera’s field of view and then detect the face of that person.  This is vital to 
the system concept.  If the system cannot distinguish both the person and their face, then 
it will not be able to perform any of the remaining required functions.  However, this 
function was only tested to a limited extent.  The test involved only one person at a time 
at very limited ranges.  The full-scale system needs to be able to detect and recognize 
multiple faces at ranges of at least 200 yards from the ship.  An additional challenge will 
be the detection and recognition of multiple persons at the same time within the same 
FOV of one camera.  This would require the face detection software to send multiple PTZ 
commands to the camera, and then the camera would have to loop through each 
command, and the system would execute facial recognition on each face in the loop. 
The next function that was tested was the autonomous facial recognition, 
associated labeling, and processing.  The proof-of-concept system was very successful 
when a valid facial image was captured.  It successfully associated the correct label and 
provided the proper alert 100% of the time.  The success rate experienced in this test was 
well above the required threshold.  This high success rate was assumed to be due to the 
limited database of only twenty images that was utilized for comparison.  When the 
number of database images is expanded to hundreds, and even thousands, the expectation 
is that the success rate will be lower.  In that case, more advanced facial recognition 
techniques can be applied.  The important conclusion from this section of testing was that 
the facial recognition portion of programming worked successfully.  However, the full-
scale Pier Watchman System is not required to use the same facial recognition algorithm.  
In other words, no requirements have been established for the exact facial recognition 
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software that the full-scale Pier Watchman System must use.  This allows the developers 
of the full-scale system to utilize the most current and accurate facial recognition 
algorithms and software that are available.   
In summary, after conducting a brief analysis of alternatives one proposed 
solution was further investigated.  Next, the facial recognition concept utilized for the 
proposed solution was discussed.  Additionally, in order to validate the viability of 
automatic facial detection and recognition a proof-of-concept system was designed and 
constructed.  The testing of the proof-of-concept system identified risk involved with 
software compatibility and provided ways to mitigate this risk.  The next chapter provides 
a summary and conclusion of this thesis and some areas that could be further researched. 
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
An assessment of current automated mustering and pier security systems 
identified a critical need for the proposed system solution.  Using the Systems 
Engineering “V” model a formal analysis of the operational need was conducted.  
Additionally, a DRM was created that established a generic architecture with a high-level 
operational view, external systems diagram, requirements, and a functional hierarchy and 
decomposition.  An analysis of alternatives led to the selection of a proposed system 
solution.  The proposed solution was further designed and an instantiated physical 
architecture was created.  The proposed solution was verified for viability through 
construction, integration, demonstration, and acceptance testing of a proof-of-concept 
system. This thesis applied the entire Systems Engineering “V” model from concept 
through validation.  
B. CONCLUSION 
The results of my research shows that an autonomous system shows great 
potential to enhance the security and situational awareness of a USS Freedom class of 
ship while it is pier side anywhere in the world.  The proof-of-concept system 
demonstrated that autonomous facial detection and recognition algorithms are a viable 
enabling technology to achieve enhanced pier security and a real time mustering 
capability for LCS ships. 
Whether or not the proposed system is further developed depends on the benefits 
that will be achieved compared to the expected costs and resources required.  The first 
benefit is the reduction of some of the administrative burden of mustering the ship’s 
crew.  This benefit is small, but the associated cost is also small.  This feature requires 
one camera that would be located in the quarterdeck area and the database required is 
merely an add-on feature of the greater database associated with the pier security feature.  
The mustering capability is also beneficial for knowing which crewmembers are on the 
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ship at any given time.  If, for instance, a fire occurs on the ship, the watch standers know 
immediately who is available onboard to respond.  Also, if there is an instance when it is 
vital that a crewmember be located, the watch standers would immediately know if that 
crewmember was on the ship. 
The greatest benefit of this type of system is the pier security feature that monitors 
the immediate area around the ship.  This feature would provide vital intelligence that can 
substantially enhance the situational awareness of the watch standers.  Through further 
product development and then deployment of the proposed system, the security of the 
USS Freedom class of LCS ships could be increased without increasing the ship’s crew 
size.   
C. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
There are further areas of research that need to be explored prior to moving 
forward with developing and installing a full scale proposed system on ships.   
First, the facial recognition algorithm that was utilized for the proof-of-concept 
system is known to be less accurate with large numbers of personnel.  Further research 
and software development needs to be conducted to procure the best facial recognition 
software possible to utilize in the full-scale system. 
Another area for further research is to develop an architecture for off ship 
reporting and networking configuration.  Additionally, this thesis did not discuss how the 
database for POI images would be created or maintained.  Furthermore, the procedures 
for reporting a confirmed POI were not discussed.  The development of a network (or 
connect to a given network) that could provide real time POI reporting, updating of facial 
images database, and alert notification to the proper intelligence agency would be another 
fertile research area. 
Finally, research into a behavioral analysis algorithm that could be superimposed 
onto the proposed system using a detect, identify, predict, and react approach similar to 
the work done by Goshorn in “Behavior Modeling for Detection, Identification, 
Prediction, and Reaction (DIPR) in AI Systems Solutions” (Goshorn, 2009) would be 
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warranted.  This would give the system the ability to “learn” behaviors and permit the 
operator to manually input behaviors considered normal.  Any behaviors not conforming 
to normal behavior criteria would then be classified as abnormal.  This research should 
also consider the ability of watch standers to easily update the system by inputting the 
known abnormal behaviors.  With the proposed system, the infrastructure is in place to 
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APPENDIX A PIER WATCHMAN PROOF-OF-CONCEPT PDL 
defineGlobals();  // functions defines global variables 
syslogin(); // login user and return permissions 
setIP(); // get IP addresses 
goGui(permissions);  // sets GUI options based on user permissions. 
goPW(opt, select); 
// Scan using panning algorithm 
while runFlag = ! FALSE do; //if user select exit, system shutsdown 
while face_detect FALSE do: 
  pan(x); 
  tilt(y); 
  zoom(z); 
  if (x, y, z >0) then do; 
   set face_detect TRUE; 
  Else; 
   face_detect FALSE; 










while alert =!null do; 
  pop(alert,id); 
  log(alert,id); 
END; 
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APPENDIX B PIER WATCHMAN PROOF-OF-CONCEPT CODE 
The following pages are the actual code that was written for the Pier Watchman 
System.  In order to properly run this code it must be utilized operated from the 
Mathworks MATLAB software with all toolboxes enabled. 
function timerTest() 
clear all; 
a = timer; 
set(a, 'ExecutionMode', 'FixedRate'); 
set(a, 'Period', 1.0); 
set(a, 'TimerFcn', 'getImage()'); 
set(a, 'TasksToExecute', 30); 
start(a); 
The ‘getImage’ function is activated by  
function getImage() 
persistent count; 
if size(count) == 0; 
    count = 0; 
end 
% expects all image files to be time stamped in the 
% c:\watchman directory 
% expects images to be named in the format image09030510063200.jpg 
% 09 = year 
% 03 = month 
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% 05 = day 
% 10 = hours 
% 06 = minutes 
% 32 = seconds 
% 00 = hundredths of seconds 
imdir = 'c:\Watchman\72\'; 
name = '.jpg'; 
prefix = 'image'; 
timeStamp = clock; 
year = mod ( timeStamp(1) , 2000 ); 
if ( year < 10 ) 
    yearStr = strcat ( '0' , int2str ( year ) ); 
else 
    yearStr = int2str ( year ); 
end 
month =  timeStamp(2); 
if ( month < 10 ) 
    monthStr = strcat ( '0' , int2str ( month ) ); 
else 
    monthStr = int2str ( month ); 
end 
day = timeStamp(3); 
if ( day < 10 ) 
    dayStr = strcat ( '0' , int2str ( day ) ); 
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else 
    dayStr = int2str ( day ); 
end 
 
hour = timeStamp(4); 
if ( hour < 10 ) 
    hourStr = strcat ( '0' , int2str ( hour ) ); 
else 
    hourStr = int2str ( hour ); 
end 
sec = timeStamp(6); 
min = timeStamp(5); 
if (sec < 4) 
    sec = sec + 56; 
    min = min - 1; 
else 
    sec = sec - 4; 
end 
if ( min < 10 ) 
    minStr = strcat ( '0' , int2str ( min ) ); 
else 
    minStr = int2str ( min ); 
end 
% introduce a delay to allow for differences in time between ftp 
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% transfer, the camera's clock, and the system clock used by matlab 
if ( sec < 10 ) 
    secStr = strcat ( '0' , int2str ( sec ) ); 
else 
    secStr = int2str ( sec ); 
end 
% converts current clock to corresponding filename, the trailing '00' is to 
% account for hundredths of seconds, which are neglected 
timeStr = strcat ( yearStr, monthStr, dayStr, hourStr, minStr, secStr, '00' ); 
imgname = strcat(imdir, prefix, timeStr, name); 
if exist(imgname) 
    img = imread(imgname); 
    imshow(img); 
       gImg = double (rgb2gray(img));     
    Face = FaceDetect('haarcascade_frontalface_alt2.xml',gImg);  
    if size(Face, 2) > 1 
         Rectangle = [Face(1) Face(2); Face(1)+Face(3) Face(2); Face(1)+Face(3) 
Face(2)+Face(4); Face(1)  Face(2)+Face(4); Face(1) Face(2)]; 
    else 
        Rectangle = []; 
    end 
    if size(Face, 2) > 1 
        isFace = 1; 
        count = count+1; 
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    else 
        isFace = 0; 
    end     
    figure(1); 
    imshow (img); 
    truesize; 
    if size(Face, 2) > 1 
        hold on; 
        plot (Rectangle(:,1), Rectangle(:,2), 'g'); 
        hold off; 
    end     
    if (count == 10) 
        x = Face(1);  
 
        y = Face(2); 
        w = Face(3); 
        h = Face(4); 
        x = x + 0.5 * w; 
        y = y + 0.5 * h; 
        if (x <= 320) 
            x = -(320-x); 
        else 
            x = x-320; 
        end 
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        if (y<=240) 
            y = -(240-y); 
 
        else 
            y = (y-240); 
        end        
%        function sonyrz30move(camera, cmd, x, y, height, width) 
        sonyrz30move(72, 'zoomin', int2str(x), int2str(y), int2str(h), int2str(w)); 




APPENDIX C HOW TO DEMONSTRATE THE PIER 
WATCHMAN PROOF-OF-CONCEPT SYSTEM 
1. Turn on the following: 
a. Sony Camera 
i. Ensure Power cord and Network cable are plugged into it. 
b. Dell Laptop #7 
c. D-Link Switch 
i. Ensure it is plugged in and green power light is lit. 
d. Wait Until Dell computer is initialized 
2. Start the golden ftp server. 
a. Icon is located in center of desktop on computer. Double Icon 
i. Directory Information C:\ProgramFiles\GoldenFTPServer\GFTP.exe 
b. Wait for program to initialize. 
i. Icon will appear in lower right of startup taskbar menu 
3. Start camera 192.168.0.72 in Firefox 
a. Initialize Mozilla Firefox program located on Desktop by double clicking 
Icon. 
i. Directory Information C:ProgramFiles\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe  
b. Wait for program to initialize 
c. Default should be the website:  http://192.168.0.72/home/homej.html 
i. If address does not match, type in the above address   
4. Put the camera in the home position 
a. Click on Control Icon at the top of the internet window (not the toolbars 
section) 
b. A menu should pop up. 
c. Use the pull down and select ‘home’ 
i. Camera should be pointing towards the left side of the Kiosk 
5. Initialize the Camera Settings Menu 
a. Click the ‘settings’ towards the top of the internet window 
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b. Authentication window will pop up. 
i. Values should already be entered just click ‘OK’ 
ii. If values not entered: User Name: watchman  Password: watchman 
6. Set Camera Settings 
a. Click on System. (located on left of window  just below Basic) 
i. Under system scroll down to ‘Date time setting’ 
ii. Select the first apply button by clicking over apply button. (this 
synchronizes clocks) 
b. Click FTP Client (located of left of window under Application section just 
below Preset Position) 
i. A window should popup select ‘Use FTP client function’ then click 
OK 
ii. All data should be as follows 
iii. FTP Server name   192.168.70 
iv. User name   anonymous 
v. Password          (blank nothing typed there) 
vi. Re-type password             (blank nothing typed there) 
vii. Remote path   Watchman\72 
viii. Image file name      image 
ix. Suffix    Date/Time 
x. Mode    Periodical sending 
xi. Interval time  00  00  01 
xii. Available period  always 
xiii. Schedule no.    1 
xiv. If the above was all correct click OK 
c. Note: you should get a popup from the golden ftp server in the bottom of the 
screen telling you that the incoming connection was started 
d. Close camera setting window.  
e. Minimize Firefox window  
7.  Load mat lab 
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8. Run 'timerTest' 
a. In Mat lab from the top toolbar, select open. (An open window should pop up) 
b. Select timer test from Open pop up window 
i. Directory:  C:\Documents and Settings\R Goshorn\My 
Documents\MATLAB\timerTest.m 
c. Once open click on run from toolbar. 
Program is running correctly if a picture appears on screen and then the image is 
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